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The Metaphysical Basis of  
Śāntideva’s Ethics1 
 
Amod Lele2 
 
Abstract 
Western Buddhists often believe and proclaim that 
metaphysical speculation is irrelevant to Buddhist ethics 
or practice. This view is problematic even with respect to 
early Buddhism, and cannot be sustained regarding later 
Indian Buddhists. In Śāntideva’s famous Bodhicaryāvatāra, 
multiple claims about the nature of reality are premises 
for conclusions about how human beings should act; that 
is, metaphysics logically entails ethics for Śāntideva, as it 
does for many Western philosophers. This article explores 
four key arguments that Śāntideva makes from 
metaphysics to ethics: actions are determined by their 
causes, and therefore we should not get angry; the body is 
reducible to its component parts, and therefore we should 
                                                
1 I presented an earlier version of this article to the Society for Asian and Comparative 
Philosophy at Asilomar, California in 2010. Thanks to Douglas Berger, Bret Davis and 
Stephen Tyman for the comments they offered there. 
2 Boston University. Email: lele@bu.edu. 
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neither protect it nor lust after other bodies; the self is an 
illusion, and therefore we should be altruistic; all 
phenomena are empty, and therefore we should not be 
attached to them. The exploration of these arguments 
together shows us why metaphysical claims can matter a 
great deal for Buddhist ethics, practice and liberation. 
 
Introduction: Buddhist Metaphysics and Buddhist Ethics  
Among Western Buddhists, it is commonplace to claim that metaphysical 
speculation is irrelevant to Buddhism. A key text cited for this claim is 
the Shorter Māluṅkya Sutta in the Pāli Canon. The monk Māluṅkyāputta 
comes to think: 
These speculative views (diṭṭhigata) have been undeclared 
by the Blessed One, set aside and rejected by him, namely: 
‘the world is eternal’ and ‘the world is not eternal’; ‘the 
world is finite’ and ‘the world is infinite’; ‘the soul is the 
same as the body’ and ‘the soul is one thing and the body 
another’; and ‘after death a Tathāgata exists’ and ‘after 
death a Tathāgata does not exist’ and ‘after death a 
Tathāgata both exists and does not exist’ and ‘after death 
a Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist. (MN i.426; 
Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 533)3 
                                                
3 I cite Sanskrit and Pāli texts other than Śāntideva’s using a reference both to the 
translation and to the original (chapter and verse if it exists, or the Pali Text Society 
page numbering where it does not). Translations of Śāntideva are my own unless 
otherwise noted, so I cite only chapter and verse. 
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Māluṅkyaputta wants to know the answers so much that he is 
ready to leave the monkhood and become a layman if the Buddha 
doesn’t answer him. The Buddha responds, not by answering any of the 
questions, but by chiding Māluṅkyaputta with his famous parable of the 
arrow: 
Suppose, Māluṅkyāputta, a man were wounded by an 
arrow thickly smeared with poison, and his friends and 
companions, his kinsmen and relatives, brought a surgeon 
to treat him. The man would say, ‘I will not let the 
surgeon pull out this arrow until I know whether the man 
who wounded me was a noble or a brahmin or a merchant 
or a worker.’ And he would say: ‘I will not let the surgeon 
pull out this arrow until I know the name and clan of the 
man who wounded me. . .’ (MN i.429; Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 
534) 
 The Buddha then gives many more examples of similar questions 
irrelevant to removing the arrow, adding: “All this would still not be 
known to that man and meanwhile he would die” (MN i.430; Ñāṇamoli 
and Bodhi 535). And so similarly, Māluṅkyāputta’s questions are a 
distraction from the urgent task at hand: “Because it is unbeneficial, it 
does not belong to the fundamentals of the holy life, it does not lead to 
disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to peace, to direct 
knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna. That is why I have left it 
undeclared” (MN i.431; Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 536). 
 Now what does this parable imply? Thich Nhat Nanh reads it as 
follows in Zen Keys:   
Buddha always told his disciples not to spend their time 
and energies in metaphysical speculation. Each time he 
was asked a question of a metaphysical kind, he remained 
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silent. He directed his disciples toward practical efforts. . . 
Life is short; it must not be spent in endless metaphysical 
speculations which will not be able to bring the truth. 
(Nhat Hanh 38–39) 
 One can find this remark of Nhat Hanh’s quoted all over the 
Internet. And there is a similar interpretation in Taitetsu Unno’s River of 
Fire, River of Water: 
This inability to know extends to metaphysical truths. In 
the famous parable of the poison arrow found in early 
Buddhism, a young monk, Malunkyaputta, is unhappy 
because the Buddha refuses to answer metaphysical 
questions. They include fourteen unanswerable questions, 
such as whether the universe is finite or not, whether the 
world is eternal or not, whether a saint lives after death or 
not, and so forth. The Buddha informs the monk that his 
teaching does not deal with metaphysical questions, 
because his Middle Path is a practical one meant to solve 
the immediate problems of living. (184) 
 Both these quotes are misleading at the very best.4 Neither Unno 
nor Nhat Hanh defines “metaphysics,” and by describing the Buddha of 
the suttas as unconcerned with an undefined “metaphysics,” they imply 
(whether they mean to or not) that he was unconcerned with a number 
of topics that he in fact identifies as being of the utmost importance. In 
these descriptions the Buddha of the suttas sounds much like a modern 
pragmatist, concerned only with immediate results and not with 
                                                
4 As I understand it, Nhat Hanh’s understanding is quite consonant with his Zen/Thien 
tradition. It may fit Unno’s Pure Land tradition as well. What it does not fit is the 
Buddha of the early suttas that they see fit to quote, nor the tenor of Indian Buddhism 
more generally. 
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understanding the nature of the world in any respect; such an 
interpretation would be a gross misunderstanding.  
 What is metaphysics? Peter van Inwagen and Meghan Sullivan 
note that the term is very difficult to define. The Greek term literally 
means “beyond physics”; it goes back to the work of Aristotle’s intended 
to be read after his Physics. Aristotle introduces the Metaphysics as 
dealing with the causes and principles that underlie existent things, at a 
level deeper than physical (including biological) explanation; it deals 
with what they fundamentally are. Van Inwagen and Sullivan, for their 
part, describe the kinds of questions studied under the rubric of 
metaphysics in the past three or four centuries. Among others, these 
include the question of whether composite entities (such as the self) 
have real existence, and freedom of the will.  
 Such questions (the ultimate nature of things, the real existence 
of composite entities, freedom of the will) are not in themselves practical 
questions; they do not on their own solve the immediate problems of 
living. But the Buddha did not dismiss them in the Shorter Māluṅkya; 
indeed, the Buddha of the suttas spoke a great deal about the unreality of 
the self, and emphasized the significance of this fact for liberation from 
suffering. We will see in this paper that for at least one major Indian 
Buddhist philosopher, questions of this sort had direct implications for 
the ways we should react to the problems of living—which is to say, for 
ethics.5 
 Now there are indeed certain specific metaphysical questions 
that the Buddha identifies as less pressing in the Shorter Māluṅkya, such 
as the eternality of the universe. What he does not do, however, is rule 
them out as part of any general indigenous category that one could 
                                                
5 By “ethics” I intend roughly the broad sense of the term suggested by Martha 
Nussbaum (23–25): reflection or inquiry on the question of how one should live. 
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translate as “metaphysics.” The word that describes these views in the 
Shorter Māluṅkya (rendered by Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi as “speculative 
views”) is diṭṭhigata, “going to views” or “resorting to views.” But diṭṭhi 
(views) as such are not dismissed in the suttas; indeed the very first 
element of the suttas’ Eightfold Path in sammādiṭṭhi, right view, which, 
when spelled out, can include understanding metaphysical questions like 
the origin of consciousness.6 And even when the Buddha dismisses diṭṭhis 
such as the eternality of the world, he does not say that such questions 
should not be asked or even that they are not part of his teaching. He 
merely points out that they are not the most urgent questions to be 
asking; others are more immediately relevant to one’s suffering.7   
Since the early days of the tradition, a large number of Buddhists 
have indeed spent significant time and energy exploring metaphysical 
questions as well as questions in related abstract philosophical fields like 
epistemology. In reading many such texts one can get the impression 
that their speculations may be questions of just the sort that are 
dismissed in the Shorter Māluṅkya: questions with no relevance to 
Buddhist practice, ethical conduct or liberation. Of the “Buddhist logic” 
of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, for example, Theodore Stcherbatsky 
claimed: “In the intention of its promotors the system had apparently no 
special connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e., as the teaching of a 
path towards Salvation” (Stcherbatsky 2). Stcherbatsky’s claim is 
overstated; Helmut Krasser points out that their writings were aimed at 
                                                
6 For example in the Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta (MN i.47-55, Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 132–144). Peter 
Harvey (11–12) notes a passage at MN iii.72 outlining other elements of reality 
contained in sammādiṭṭhi.   
7 In this regard one might even extend the parable of the arrow. The parable proclaims 
that if one has been shot with an arrow, one needs to have it removed before asking 
who shot it. Once it has been removed, however, if one wishes to help other people and 
the shooter is still out there, one would do very well to ask detailed questions about 
who the shooter is, that one might find him and stop him.  
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non-Buddhists with the attempt to get them onto the Buddhist path. 
Still, specific practical implications of their theoretical claims can 
sometimes be difficult to imagine.  
 The implications are not so difficult to imagine in the 
increasingly well known eighth-century Indian Madhyamaka 
philosopher, Śāntideva. His Bodhicaryāvatāra (“Introduction to the 
Conduct of the Bodhisattva,” here abbreviated BCA) not only makes 
many metaphysical arguments amid its claims about how human beings 
should live their lives, it directly emphasizes the relevance of the former 
to the latter.  
 That metaphysical arguments provide a basis for ethical claims is 
often taken for granted in Western philosophy. Plato identifies the 
cosmic One with the Good; Aquinas derives his ethics of natural law from 
a teleology in nature; Kant’s ethics rest on a distinction between the 
autonomous and heteronomous will. But Buddhist philosophy is often 
not taken to work this way; its sophisticated rational arguments about 
the world and the self are treated as if they have little if anything to do 
with ethical conduct. It is in this context that Damien Keown can deny 
that such a thing as Buddhist ethics even exists: 
While Buddhist teachings include normative aspects, such 
as the Five Precepts and the rules of the Vinaya, these are 
typically presented simply as injunctions, rather than as 
conclusions logically deduced from explicitly stated 
values and principles. In other words, the Precepts are 
simply announced, and one is left to figure out the 
invisible superstructure from which they are derived. 
Thus although Buddhism has normative teachings, it does 
not have normative ethics. (“Morality” 50) 
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I have discussed before (“Revaluation” 45–49) why I think 
Keown’s claim is invalid with respect to Śāntideva, and I think this 
article provides further demonstration of the point. I think it is relevant 
that Keown elsewhere—before he said Buddhism had no normative 
ethics—seemed to have himself taken the position that metaphysics was 
not helpful for ethics: “to pursue the issue of the ultimate ontological 
constitution of individual natures in this context is to confuse ethics 
with metaphysics, and does not make for a fruitful line of enquiry” 
(Nature 19). By contrast, I offer the suggestion that metaphysical 
arguments like Śāntideva’s are among the most fruitful resources for 
Buddhist normative ethics. Indeed, by making an interconnected system 
of metaphysical and ethical arguments, Śāntideva appears more clearly 
than many other Indian thinkers to be engaging in the traditional 
Western conception of philosophy as an interconnected system of 
theoretical and practical philosophy, like Aristotle’s or Kant’s.8  
 Śāntideva is not alone in his use of metaphysics as a foundation 
for ethical claims. Most notably, the Bodhicaryāvatāra’s connection of 
metaphysics to ethics has close resonances to the “four illusions” with 
which Karen Lang titles her translation of Candrakīrti’s commentary on 
Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka. These, too, are metaphysical errors which lead 
to ethical missteps. Āryadeva’s list of metaphysical errors—perceiving 
the impermanent as permanent, the painful as pleasant, the impure as 
pure and the non-self as self—is a widespread Indian list of four 
“inversions” (viparyāsa or vipallāsa). The list of four goes back at least to 
the Pāli Paṭisambhidāmagga, with a related formula in the Aṅguttara 
                                                
8  Others have often noted Śāntideva’s arguments from metaphysics to ethics 
individually: Goodman and Siderits on the move from dependent origination to patient 
endurance, Gómez and Williams (“Absence”) on selflessness (and to a lesser extent 
emptiness). It is far less common to note just how many different and separate 
arguments from metaphysics to ethics pervade the text.  
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Nikāya itself, and is also found in non-Buddhist texts, most notably the 
Patañjali Yoga Sūtra; it takes on other permutations in tathāgatagarbha 
texts (Bohanec). But it is notable that Āryadeva and Candrakīrti 
specifically make ethical criticisms based on the four metaphysical 
inversions; each one leads us to bad behaviour. Grief and attachment 
come from the illusion of permanence; pleasure-seeking comes from 
illusion of pleasure; lust comes from the illusion of purity; egotism 
comes from the illusion of self (Lang). 
 Śāntideva, by contrast, is not relying on a stock list of inversions 
and does not systematize them as a list of four. His text is in many 
respects more innovative. As we will see, he has a different list of 
illusions and their consequences, and his ethical exhortations are 
therefore quite different (though not necessarily incompatible). 
Roughly, Śāntideva shares a critique of attachment and lust with 
Āryadeva and Candrakīrti. But he adds a critique of anger, based on 
causality, and his critique of selfishness is more far-reaching. Candrakīrti 
limits that critique to the political sphere, against the egotism of a king; 
Śāntideva urges an attack on all self-concern.  
 Moreover, Śāntideva’s four claims are structured differently from 
Candrakīrti’s: they are progressive. They occur in a specific order. The 
first two could be shared with non-Mahāyāna traditions, but the third is 
specifically Mahāyāna and the fourth specifically Madhyamaka, in a way 
that supersedes the previous three. Despite Candrakīrti’s fame as an 
expositor of Madhyamaka in his other works (such as the Prasannapadā 
or Madhyamakāvatāra), this is not a move that he makes. Candrakīrti 
simply lays out the four errors and their consequences; for Śāntideva 
they are embedded in a larger whole. 
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The Bodhicaryāvatāra  and its Metaphysical Sections 
The Bodhicaryāvatāra is a poetic, beautiful and mostly accessible text. For 
that reason it, or selections from it, often serve as an introduction to 
Mahāyāna and to Buddhist ethics. It is widely taught in first-year 
Buddhism courses and excerpted in anthologies, some not even 
specifically about Buddhism (such as Cooper).  
 Most such treatments, however, skip the text’s ninth chapter—a 
notable exception to the accessibility of the rest of the BCA. This 
chapter, devoted to the perfection of prajñā, focuses almost entirely on 
metaphysical questions. It is unquestionably difficult. As a result, it is 
rarely excerpted; many introductory classes instruct students to skip it 
or skim it.9 (These include classes I have taught myself.) Pema Chödrön 
takes this approach in her print commentary, recognizing the 
importance of the ninth chapter but claiming it “requires a book in 
itself” (xv–xvi). 
 Chödrön’s decision is defensible: the ninth chapter is more 
difficult than the rest of the work, and commenting on it does take up 
more space. For that reason I paid it relatively little attention in my own 
dissertation on Śāntideva; but that decision did come at a cost. In the 
later portions of the dissertation that dealt with constructive 
application, I identified the arguments that Martha Nussbaum makes 
against thinkers like Śāntideva and showed how he would respond. But 
what I was not able to do there was turn it around and identify the 
arguments Śāntideva might make against thinkers like Nussbaum—in 
part, I would argue here, because such arguments would rest on the very 
metaphysical claims that the dissertation was not able to explore.  
                                                
9  The argument for determinism in the sixth chapter, discussed below, is often given 
the same treatment. 
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 More generally, something of great importance to the BCA is left 
out when its metaphysical sections are left out. Those difficult parts 
contain Śāntideva’s own reasoning for his ethical claims, his arguments. As 
this paper will demonstrates, Śāntideva logically deduces much of his 
ethics from this metaphysics. Without understanding that metaphysics 
and the reasoning from it, we will not understand the ethics. 
 Classical Indian and Tibetan sources recognized the ninth chapter 
as significant. The Subhāṣitasaṁgraha, one of the only extant Indian texts 
to quote Śāntideva, draws its quotes primarily from that chapter 
(Bendall viii). Prajñākaramati, Śāntideva’s extant Sanskrit commentator, 
devotes far more space to it than to any other chapter (even though the 
eighth chapter is slightly longer). Michael Sweet notes that Tibetan 
commentators also devoted much more space to the ninth chapter than 
the others. He claims that this fact is evidence that the commentators 
viewed the ninth chapter to be the “intellectual pinnacle” of the BCA 
(“Śāntideva” 6). I don’t think this fact is sufficient evidence for that 
claim; it may just be they devoted so much space to the ninth chapter 
because they knew it was so much harder (as when Chödrön promises a 
separate book on it). Nevertheless, what is indisputable is that the 
commentators did treat the ninth chapter as a valuable, significant and 
integral portion of the text. 
 From a literary or philological perspective, we will understand 
the BCA’s ninth chapter better if we recognize that its claims are not a 
bizarre idiosyncratic addendum to the rest of the text. This article will 
show how the ninth chapter’s claims follow a pattern established in 
chapters that precede it: metaphysical arguments lead to ethical 
conclusions. It is an integral portion of the BCA, just as the classical 
commentators believed it to be.  
 The paper will highlight what I take to be the four arguments in 
the Bodhicaryāvatāra that explicitly derive ethical conclusions from 
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metaphysical premises—only the last of which is featured in the ninth 
chapter. Each one describes a way in which ordinary people make a 
mistake about the nature of reality, and this mistake in turn leads them 
to act in inappropriate ways. We ordinary people think that there is 
independent agency, and as a result we get angry; we think that human 
bodies have existence as wholes, which allows us to be lustful; we think 
that there is a self, so we act out of self-interest; and we think there is 
substantial existence, and therefore feel attachment.  
 We think that these are reasonable ways to behave in practice 
because we make these metaphysical mistakes. The logical conclusion 
Śāntideva draws from knocking down each error is that we should act 
differently, and he believes that if we understood how the world really 
was, we would feel differently and do things differently. It is a move from 
fact to value, from is to ought.   
 These arguments occur within the BCA’s overall context, which 
depicts the bodhisattva’s progressive journey. Its first chapter begins 
with reasons that becoming a bodhisattva is urgent, followed by a 
confession of bad karma that indicates how lowly we are to start. The 
text then moves through the cultivation of the bodhisattva’s perfections 
(paramitās). Chapters six through nine of the BCA are explicitly identified 
with four of the six perfections of the bodhisattva: kṣānti (patient 
endurance), vīrya (heroic strength), dhyāna (meditative concentration) 
and prajñā (metaphysical insight).10  
 Before proceeding to examine the BCA’s metaphysical-ethical 
arguments in detail, a few text-critical notes are in order. In this article I 
                                                
10 The perfections are traditionally held to be in an order that gets progressively better, 
with these four, in this order, being the last of the six. Śāntideva’s phrasing in BCA V.83 
seems to endorse the idea that the perfections are progressive. The Pāramitāsamāsa of 
Āryaśūra similarly describes the structure of the perfections in order (see Meadows). 
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am referring to the “canonical” recension of the BCA, the one known to 
later Indian and Tibetan tradition, rather than the earlier recension 
found at Dunhuang (on which see Saitō). I use the name “Śāntideva” to 
refer to the redactor of this recension, as opposed to the author of the 
older version who went by Akṣayamati.11  
 This article relies generally on P. L. Vaidya’s edition of the BCA 
(which is based on Louis de la Vallée Poussin’s), with one significant 
exception: the numbering of verses in the BCA’s key ninth chapter. 
Crosby and Skilton (113) claim that Vaidya and Poussin numbered the 
verses based on a mistake made in one Sanskrit manuscript of the text, 
which had copied the equivalent of a single verse twice. The alternative 
numbering that Crosby and Skilton follow is found in other Sanskrit 
manuscripts, throughout the Tibetan tradition, and in most translations, 
so I adhere to it instead of to the Sanskrit (i.e., Poussin and Vaidya) 
editions. 
 
Dependent Origination against Anger 
The first major metaphysical discussion in the Bodhicaryāvatāra is in 
chapter six, praising the virtue of patient endurance (kṣānti) against 
anger. Śāntideva appears to divide patient endurance into three varieties 
which, as Crosby and Skilton (45) note, effectively correspond to sections 
of the chapter12: the patient endurance that is the enduring of suffering 
                                                
11 For a discussion and defense of this approach to Śāntideva, see Lele Revaluation 13–
29. There I also defend reading the Bodhicaryāvatāra together with the Śikṣāsamuccaya, 
which plays a larger role in the dissertation than it does here.  
12 The list of three varieties of kṣānti does not appear in the BCA proper, but it appears 
both in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, traditionally attributed to Śāntideva (ŚS 179), and in 
Prajñākaramati’s commentary on BCA VI.9 (BCAP 172). 
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(duṣkhâdhivāsanakṣānti); the patient endurance from reflecting on the 
dharma (dharmanidhyānakṣānti); and the patient endurance that is 
patience toward others’ wrongdoing (parâpakāramarṣaṇakṣānti).  
 I have examined the first and third varieties elsewhere 
“Revaluation” 102–113). Here, I am concerned with the second variety, 
the patient endurance from reflecting on the dharma, which is treated in 
BCA VI.22-33. From the context, the term “the dharma” here refers to 
the metaphysical nature of beings—specifically, that they are beings 
without free will, without agency. They are part of the chain of cause 
and effect, and this point has consequences for how we should react to 
them and their behaviour.  
 Śāntideva begins his argument on this topic with an analogy that 
sets human beings’ bad actions in the context of the physical and 
biological universe: “even when my bile and so on make great suffering, I 
have no anger. So why is there anger at sentient beings? They too are 
angry with a cause” (VI.22).13 When we have a stomach ache we may get 
upset or unhappy, but we do not get angry—because we understand that 
there’s a reason it happened, even if we don’t know what it is, and we 
just deal with it. Śāntideva is asking us to react to other people’s bad 
behavior the same way that we would a stomach ache: it is just a bad 
thing we have to deal with, not something worthy of pain or anger. 
 He extends the analogy with a psychological point about our 
anger and others’: “Just as this sharp stomach pain arises even though it 
                                                
13 Śāntideva appears to be making a pun in this verse. The normal Sanskrit words for 
anger, which he uses liberally, are dveṣa and krodha. Here, instead, he uses kopa, which 
does mean “anger”—but also, in medical texts like the Suśruta Saṃhitā, has the sense of 
“morbid irritation of the humours of the body,” the same kind of humours (pitta “and 
so on”) that he has just referred to earlier in the verse. One could preserve the sense of 
the pun in English with “we do not feel bilious toward our bile.”  
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is undesired, so anger arises involuntarily (balāt), even though it is 
undesired. A person does not think ‘I am enraged’ and become enraged 
by his own wish. And anger does not arise thinking ‘I will arise’” (VI.23-
4). Others’s anger comes about because of external causes and not 
intentionally; so too does our own. We don’t decide to become angry, 
and anger itself doesn’t decide to happen; we need to think of it all as 
part of the chain of causes. 
 Those first verses elaborate Śāntideva’s basic claim, drawing an 
inference from the metaphysics of causation to an ethics of patient 
endurance. So far he has retained the poetic, image-rich style of the 
majority of his text, but in the following verses, he turns briefly to 
technical metaphysical arguments in a similar style to those in chapter 
nine. Why? Because he needs to answer objections. A determinist denial 
of free will was a controversial one in India as elsewhere, and if 
Śāntideva is going to make the points of verses 22-24 stick, he needs to 
defend them against the theoretical grounds on which others might 
oppose them.  
 In VI.25 he makes the claim more starkly: “any various offenses 
and bad karma (pāpa) whatsoever all arise from the force of a causal 
condition (pratyaya), and nobody sees them arising independently.” He 
adds in VI.26 that the totality of causes does not think “I will create,” nor 
does what is created think “I am created.” This is an articulation of a 
basic Abhidharmic (and not specifically Madhyamaka) metaphysics: the 
world is a chain of causes working according to impersonal dependent 
co-origination, and nothing more than that. But for Śāntideva this 
metaphysical claim has ethical implications that are rarely drawn out in 
earlier texts: because the world is causally dependent, it makes no sense 
to blame anyone and get angry at them.  
 With his position stated, Śāntideva is now in a position to answer 
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agency or decisions, and therefore blame. Verses 27–28 rebut the 
Sāṁkhya view, which distinguishes between puruṣa (spirit, self) and 
prakṛti or pradhāna (matter or nature). Verses 29-30 rebut the idea of an 
eternal insentient self, associated with the Vaiśeṣika view. 
 A typical modern reader skims over these verses quickly—
understandably, because they are difficult and require a great deal of 
context. But their points are important for Śāntideva as a way of 
establishing firmly that there is no agency anywhere—so that there is no 
legitimate place to put blame. 
 That is Śāntideva’s ultimate upshot. He draws his final conclusion 
in verse 33: “Therefore, whether one has seen an enemy or a friend 
doing unjust acts, one should think ‘it has such causes,’ and become 
happy.” It is an ethical conclusion from the metaphysics. Everything is 
subject to a cause, with no agency, so don’t blame, and don’t get angry.14  
 This metaphysics is essential to the larger argument of the 
chapter. The specific verses about Sāṁkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may be 
less important in a context where such views are not live options, but 
the overall project of establishing a determinist metaphysics is central to 
Śāntideva’s reasoning against anger. 
 The metaphysics in question is pratītya samutpāda, a pan-Buddhist 
metaphysical claim that any Buddhist, Mahāyāna or otherwise, could 
support. The critique of anger is likewise a stock feature of many 
Buddhist texts. What is unusual in Śāntideva is the connection: because the 
world is causally dependent, it makes no sense to blame anyone or get 
                                                
14 There is an ongoing debate between Charles Goodman (e.g., ”Resentment”) and Mark 
Siderits (e.g., ”Freedom”) on the interpretation of this section. Siderits takes Śāntideva 
to be a “paleo-compatibilist,” arguing that blame and moral responsibility can still 
legitimately be assigned on his view; Goodman denies this, assigning Śāntideva a hard 
determinism. 
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angry at them. That connection is far less frequently made in other texts; 
for example, anger is not identified as one of the products of 
Candrakīrti’s four illusions. 
 
The Atomized and Devalued Body 
The second significant metaphysical discussion in the BCA, in verses 
VIII.40-83, takes an atomistic biology as an argument against lust–
against attachment to others’ bodies as well as one’s own. Of the four 
lines of argument Śāntideva takes, this one is probably the most 
commonly found in wider Buddhist tradition. It is found in Candrakīrti 
(Lang 164–185), and in plenty of early Buddhist texts for that matter.  
 Śāntideva’s metaphysical claim is that when understood 
properly, the body is no more than its component parts. But only the 
whole body is capable of exciting desire; the parts do not. For that 
reason, lust is an illusion. Outside of Śāntideva’s works, this lesson was 
perhaps most memorably expressed in the story of Subhā in the Pāli 
Therigathā. Trying to seduce a nun named Subhā, a man sings her a 
lyrical love poem about how beautiful her eyes are; Subhā plucks one of 
her eyes out and hands it to him, saying that if he likes it so much he can 
have it. The man begs her forgiveness (TG XIV.1; Thanissaro). 
 Śāntideva follows a very similar line of reasoning, deconstructing 
the body: it is composed of bones, meat, feces. Crosby and Skilton (92) 
have a memorable translation of BCA VIII.49: “They produce both spit 
and shit from the single source of food. You do not want the shit from it. 
Why are you so fond of drinking the spit?” At VIII.63-4 Śāntideva urges 
his readers to look at a corpse, and then notes: you don’t want the body 
when the skin is ripped off; why do you want it with the skin on? 
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One finds an interesting variant on the deconstruction of the 
body earlier in the text for a different purpose, in chapter five. Here the 
metaphysical argument appears in a collapsed and more practical and 
meditative form, and for a different ethical conclusion. He says:  
First, with your own intellect, act on this bag of skin just 
as you release meat from its cage of bones, with a sword of 
wisdom. Having done this to the bones, see the marrow 
inside and reflect to yourself: “What is the essence here?” 
Having sought in this way, you see no essence here. Now 
say: why do you still guard the body? (BCA V.62–64) 
 Here again the body is reducible to its component parts; the 
metaphysical claim is very similar. But the body at issue here is not a 
loved one’s, but one’s own. From these verses, the ethical conclusion is 
that one’s own body is not worthy of special protection, and so one 
should subjugate it. That is, here the argument is a justification for the 
precisely regulated details of monastic comportment offered in the fifth 
chapter—about how one eats, points, walks. The body has no worth in 
itself, only for alleviating suffering, and so one should control it and 
regulate it in a manner that serves that purpose.  
The argument about the body is more concrete than the other 
metaphysical arguments discussed here, but it takes the same approach 
that they do: reasoning from metaphysics to ethics. The world is a 
certain way; therefore, we should act and feel a certain way. Just as the 
unreality of agency means we shouldn’t blame or get angry, so the 
unreality of the body means we should neither protect it nor lust. As 
with anger and agency this is a point found in non-Mahāyāna texts, and 
this metaphysics-ethics connection is made more often than the 
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connection on anger. It is worth noting here because it is one more 
example of the metaphysics-ethics connection in the BCA.15 
 
Non-self  against Self-interest 
No doubt the most famous of Śāntideva’s metaphysics-ethics 
connections is the third one, found in BCA VIII.90–119. The verses 
following this section in chapter eight are the major source for the 
Tibetan Lojong (blo sbyong) meditation tradition (Sweet “Mental 
Purification” 245), with their meditative practice of “exchange of self 
and other”: imagining oneself in another’s place and vice versa. What is 
of interest here is the previous section on the “equalization” of self and 
other, a philosophical argument. The exchange of self and other follows 
this argument because it tries to put the argument’s conclusion into 
practice, realize it.  
 The argument of BCA VIII.90–119 has become more well known 
independently in recent years. It is now even excerpted in an 
introductory ethics textbook (Cooper) alongside the likes of Kant and 
Mencius—the only Buddhist text in that book—likely because it is so 
visibly a logical argument to ethical conclusions, of the sort that Keown 
(”Morality”) finds so rare in Buddhist thought. The argument has 
become controversial in contemporary discussions; Paul Williams even 
argues that through this argument Śāntideva has “destroyed the 
bodhisattva path” (Altruism). Many have argued against Williams (e.g., 
Clayton); there is no room to get into that debate here. The important 
point here is that this argument, though overall Śāntideva’s most 
                                                
15 Or two, depending on how one counts. From the one metaphysical premise of the 
body’s reducibility there are two arguably separate ethical conclusions: the uselessness 
of lust and the subjugation of the body. 
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innovative, fits neatly into a more general pattern found in many places 
in the BCA: an argument from metaphysical premises to ethical 
conclusions. 
 Specifically, Śāntideva argues from the metaphysics of non-self to 
ethical selflessness. Here, for the first time, we get a specifically 
Mahāyāna ethics; the previous two points could have been found in any 
kind of Buddhism. Of course there is nothing specifically Mahāyāna 
about the pan-Buddhist metaphysical idea of anātman. What is peculiarly 
Mahāyāna is selflessness in an ethical sense: not just that we are selfless, 
in the sense that the self is not real, but that we should be selfless, in the 
sense of altruistic: trying to save all beings, and not only ourselves, from 
suffering. And what is remarkable and innovative in Śāntideva, beyond 
other Mahāyāna thinkers, is that he connects the two kinds of 
selflessness—as he connected dependent co-origination with non-anger. 
Mahāyāna texts before him praised altruism and agreed with non-self, 
but did not try to show that the former followed from the latter. 
 How does Śāntideva make this argument? His major claim is that 
distinctions between selves are illusory. Supposedly distinct selves are 
all the same in their nature to both experience suffering and desire its 
end: 
When happiness is equally dear to me and to others, then 
what is special about myself that I strive after my 
happiness alone? When fear and suffering are not dear to 
myself or to others, then what is special about my self that 
I protect it and not another? (VIII.95–96) 
 This argument is clearly important to Śāntideva; the portion 
about suffering is repeated at the very beginning of the root text (kārikā) 
of his other work, the Śikṣāsamuccaya. The claim can sound bizarre at 
first. One could certainly defend the difference between self and other, 
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in the name of self-interest. The obvious objection to Śāntideva is: 
others’ suffering doesn’t affect me, so why should I prevent it? It is in 
response to this objection that I think Śāntideva’s argument gets most 
interesting. He has a reply to it:  
If I don’t protect another because his suffering cannot 
hurt me, the sufferings of my future body are not mine. 
Why is that hurt protected against? “I am the same even 
then” is a false conception, because the one that dies is 
very different from the one that is born. (VIII.97–98) 
 This reply requires a bit of unpacking. Some have taken the 
“born” and “dies” literally—there is a different body in the next life than 
in this one, across rebirths. Prajñākaramati, Śāntideva’s Sanskrit 
commentator, reads the verse this way, as do many Tibetan 
commentators.  
 But others have taken it in a very different way: the “future 
body” is my body in the future of this life. Some Tibetan commentators 
do this, like Gyaltshab Je (rgyal tshab rje) and Sonam Tsemo (bsod nams 
rtse mo) (Williams “Absence” 32–34). Moreover, this is also the 
interpretation in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, the other major work attributed to 
Śāntideva. The Śikṣā gives these exact same passages and glosses them as 
follows:  
When the fetus is dead another is born, the child; when 
childhood is dead, adolescence; from the destruction of 
that comes the youth. And from destruction of that, the 
old man. How is the one body dead? Thus at every 
moment the body is different, like hair, nails and so on. 
(ŚS 358) 
 Here, the meaning is: my body is different from moment to moment, 
and what I do to protect my body now affects a different body five seconds 
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from now. I argue that in thinking about Śāntideva’s ethics we have good 
reason to take this second interpretation, from the Śikṣā. This is partially 
because of the attribution of common authorship,16 but perhaps more 
importantly, simply because the Śikṣā’s interpretation is philosophically 
much more powerful: it works much better as a refutation of the selfish 
objector. 
 As I understand it, if one thinks “I’m not going to prevent others’ 
suffering because it doesn’t affect me,” Śāntideva’s response is: “Well, 
preventing your suffering doesn’t affect you either, because you five 
seconds from now is not you now.” If I brush my teeth now, it’s a 
different person whose cavities are prevented; even if I decide to eat a 
piece of chocolate now, it’s a different person who gets to enjoy it. For 
Śāntideva here, anātman is expressed as a time-atomism with respect to 
the self; the continuity of self across time is a fiction. The discussion of 
the body earlier in the BCA broke the self down in space; this discussion 
now breaks it down in time. 
 Śāntideva then provides a second and related argument: “If you 
say ‘only the person who has the suffering should guard against it,’ the 
foot’s suffering is not the hand’s, so why does the one protect the 
other?” (VIII.99). That is, the distinction between persons is no bigger 
than the distinction within persons, between the hand and the foot. If I 
say “I feel the pain and you don’t,” the same is true of the foot and the 
hand. When we think in these terms, we no longer have a reason to 
protect self over other. The nature of suffering is free-floating. It is 
                                                
16 Later Buddhist tradition has unanimously viewed the Bodhicaryāvatāra and 
Śikṣāsamuccaya as compositions by the same author. Modern scholars do not dispute 
that the texts had an author in common, though the nature of that authorship is 
difficult to establish because they are composite texts. Beyond that, the BCA itself 
(V.105) recommends that one consult the Śikṣāsamuccaya. See Lele (“Revaluation” 8–28) 
for a more detailed discussion of these issues. 
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something to be prevented, but doesn’t belong to anyone in particular: 
“All sufferings are unowned because there is no difference among them; 
they should be prevented just because they are suffering. Why a 
restriction in this regard?” (VIII.102). 
 Now if suffering does not belong to us, as Śāntideva has been 
saying, then we may well start wondering why we should bother 
preventing it at all. To this Śāntideva replies: “If you say ‘why should 
suffering be prevented?’: because that is not disputed by anyone. If it 
should be prevented, all of it should be. If not, this goes for oneself as for 
everyone else” (VIII.103). This comment, I submit, is intended to work 
similarly to John Stuart Mill’s famous remark in the fourth chapter of 
Utilitarianism that “the sole evidence it is possible to produce that 
anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.” G. E. Moore 
famously saw this claim of Mill’s as a fallacy resting on linguistic 
equivocation, but I think Alasdair MacIntyre’s more sympathetic reading 
is more helpful:  
He treats the thesis that all men desire pleasure as a 
factual assertion which guarantees the success of an ad 
hominem appeal to anyone who denies his conclusion. If 
anyone denies that pleasure is desirable, then we can ask 
him, But don’t you desire it? and we know in advance that 
he must answer yes, and consequently must admit that 
pleasure is desirable. (MacIntyre 152) 
 Similarly, Śāntideva does not think anyone is seriously going to 
dispute that suffering should be prevented. If they really tried to dispute 
that, it would be just for the sake of argument, not because they actually 
believe it. So there is no need to argue against such an objection, 
whereas there is a need to argue against the many real people who would 
try to prevent only their own suffering and not others’.  
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 This, then, is a third argument from metaphysics to ethics—this 
time from metaphysical selflessness to ethical selflessness. Because the 
self is not real, we should not privilege it over others.  
 This argument became influential in Tibet, but it was relatively 
new with Śāntideva. It is instructive, for example, to compare it to the 
approach of Āryadeva and Candrakīrti to self and egotism. They too 
identify self as a key metaphysical error (as one might expect), and 
Āryadeva’s first verse on the subject sounds similar to Śāntideva’s: 
“What wise person would have pride in thinking ‘I’ and ‘mine’, since all 
objects in the cycle of existence are common to all embodied beings?” 
(Lang 186). 
 But as it turns out, in that text the pride ends up being more 
important than the “I” and “mine.” Āryadeva’s argument, and 
Candrakīrti’s commentary on it, turn out in fact to be directed at 
egotism—egotism in the narrow sense of being puffed up, rather than of 
self-interested action—and specifically at the egotism of a king. 
Candrakīrti explains: “Since the king certainly has egotism and 
selfishness in abundance, primarily the king is advised here about their 
removal” (Lang 186). So their discussion turns out to be above all a 
political theory, telling a king not to rule oppressively.  
 Śāntideva, by contrast, is not interested in politics; his chief 
advice to kings (in the Śikṣāsamuccaya) is to give their entire kingdoms 
away. (See Lele “Compassionate” for more on Śāntideva’s politics, or lack 
thereof.) His critique is more in line with common Mahāyāna views: not 
about criticizing self-absorbed kings, but about criticizing self-interested 
action more broadly.  
 While Śāntideva’s ethical conclusion to this question is 
characteristically Mahāyāna, neither the premise nor the conclusion is 
specifically Madhyamaka, since suffering itself is not (yet) 
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deconstructed. Crosby and Skilton (82–87) identify it more specifically 
with a Cittamātra (Yogācāra) view, because Cittamātra typically sees the 
highest truth in the absence of duality. They read this as translating into 
the absence of self-other duality. I am skeptical about that interpretation, 
at least if “other” is considered to be “other sentient beings,” as it seems 
to be here. But they are quite right that what we’re dealing with is a 
Mahāyāna argument that is not Madhyamaka.  
 Crosby and Skilton are also quite right to note that the ordering 
of Śāntideva’s metaphysical arguments suggests a progress in the text. 
The first two arguments are pan-Buddhist; Buddhaghosa could have 
agreed with them. This argument is specifically Mahāyāna, but it is not 
Madhyamaka. The final argument, however, is at the highest, 
Madhyamaka, level. I turn to that argument now. 
 
Emptiness against Attachment 
Having seen the metaphysical arguments of the preceding chapters and 
their significance, we are now in a much better position to understand 
the BCA’s ninth chapter. In previous chapters of the BCA, metaphysics 
played a relatively small role (between ten and thirty verses of a 
chapter); here, it takes center stage, featuring in the vast majority of the 
chapter’s 167 verses. But the role played by metaphysics here is quite 
comparable to the role in the previous chapters: it underpins an ethical 
argument, an argument about how human beings should live. 
 The ninth chapter articulates the Madhyamaka view that 
everything is empty (śūnya), not ultimately real. Anything we can 
perceive or speak of exists only at the level of conventional usage. 
Śāntideva’s method for establishing this point is similar to the method 
used in chapter six (above): refute all the objections to it that he can 
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imagine.17 And the ethical upshot of this argument is that one should not 
feel any attachment to worldly goods, like possessions or lovers. Because 
they have no real existence, they are not worthy of that attachment. 
 The nature of the position of emptiness is that it supersedes 
everything—including all the positions Śāntideva has taken in previous 
chapters. Parts of chapter nine recap each of the metaphysical claims of 
previous chapters: verses 71–77 deconstruct the self and causality, 72–78 
deconstruct the body, while 57–60 deconstruct both self and body. But 
Śāntideva’s arguments in this chapter imply that each of the 
metaphysical claims he has made before is itself inadequate in its own 
way. 
 Recall that the critique of anger rested on the idea that 
everything has a cause, in the chain of dependent co-origination. By the 
end of chapter nine, however, Śāntideva has rejected causality too. In 
IX.145 he asks: “For an existing entity, what’s the need for a cause (hetu)? 
And for a nonexisting entity, what’s the need for a cause?” That is, if 
something really existed, it wouldn’t need a cause to bring it into being; 
if it didn’t, it really wouldn’t need a cause at all. There are now echoes of 
the Sāṁkhya view that nothing is really created or destroyed, and 
therefore doesn’t have a cause. From here he proceeds to a more radical 
point:  
Thus there is no cessation and no coming-to-be of 
anything. And therefore this whole universe has neither 
begun nor ceased. Rather, states of existence (gati) are like 
                                                
17 Because he uses this style of argument, Tibetan commentators have described 
Śāntideva, like Candrakīrti, as a Prāsaṅgika. Saitō (261) urges caution on this matter, 
however, noting that his views show considerable affinities with non-Prāsaṅgika 
philosophers. 
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dreams; on reflection they are like the trunk of a plaintain 
tree.18 (IX.149–150) 
 So it turns out that chapter six’s thinking in terms of blameless 
causes is inadequate. And the same is true for the argument against lust. 
At IX.77 he recommends what he calls a “meditation on no-self”—and 
the self here is thought of in terms of the body. The verses that follow 
deconstruct the body, as in the earlier chapter—but both no-self and 
bodily deconstruction now look different. 
 Śāntideva begins this section saying the body is not really 
existent because we can break it down into parts and smaller parts: foot 
into toes, toes into joints, joints into their constituent parts. So far, the 
metaphysics is the same as in the argument against lust. But after that, 
he breaks down those constituent parts into their smallest possible 
parts, aṇus. Aṇu (or paramaṇu) is usually translated “atom”, and it means 
this in the Greek sense of a-tomos, indivisible; but the “atom” translation 
could be misleading in the light of modern chemistry and physics, where 
we now think of “atoms” as divisible into smaller units. From a modern 
physicist’s perspective, it could be preferable to think of aṇus as quarks 
rather than atoms. 
From there Śāntideva takes a further step: “that aṇu too can be 
divided into directional parts (digvibhāga)” (IX.86). That is, even the 
smallest possible unit, an atom or quark, must still have directions, or 
sides—a side that faces north, a side facing south. And those directions 
are effectively parts, so whatever unit we presume indivisible turns out 
to be divisible after all. And then finally he adds: “The directional parts, 
because they have no component parts, are just empty space (ākāśa). 
                                                
18 The trunk of a plantain tree is hollow. 
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Therefore the aṇu does not exist” (IX.87). When we reduce things far 
enough, we are left only with their emptiness.  
 This further decomposition of the body works quite differently 
from the previous one. Before, the body was divided into its bodily parts, 
which aroused disgust rather than lust. Now we have taken it further to 
straight emptiness, where disgust is not an issue. (The first level of 
reduction would fit comfortably in the Pāli Abhidhamma, but not this 
one.)  
 So likewise for the deconstruction of the self. In chapter eight, 
the self had been replaced by free-floating suffering: one must prevent 
all suffering, not just what belongs to the self. But in chapter nine 
Śāntideva rejects the existence of even that suffering. He asks 
rhetorically at IX.88: “if suffering really exists, why does it not bother 
the cheerful?” 
 So, the emptiness in this chapter supersedes the other three 
metaphysical claims. This is superseding in a Hegelian sense (Aufhebung, 
sublation): that is, transcending but including. It is the highest of the 
four claims, both truer and more pragmatically effective than the others, 
but the others retain their value at a lower level. 
 Like the other claims, though, emptiness has clear and powerful 
ethical implications for Śāntideva. At the end of chapter nine, Śāntideva 
makes it clear that because things are empty, we should not be attached 
to them. Worldly goods are not worth the significance we usually give to 
them, the attachments we normally have. “When all things are empty in 
this way, what could be obtained or taken? Who could become honoured 
or humiliated, and by whom? From what could there be happiness or 
suffering? What could be liked or hated?” (IX.151-2). There is still no 
reason to feel anger or lust or self-interest, but these are now all 
subsumed as a part of feeling no attachment at all—which then passes 
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into concern for those who haven’t figured this out yet, the concern of 
the tenth and final chapter. 
 So, this fourth and final argument from metaphysics to ethics 
supersedes the others, both metaphysically and ethically: everything 
(including agency, body, self and more) is empty, so don’t get attached to 
any of it. In Śāntideva’s view, emptiness is a more powerful reason to be 
non-attached than the more basic ones given before (that they are 
causally contingent, reducible and without enduring self). Each of those 
previous reasons gives some reason to be non-attached, but they will 
still create a danger of attachment because they leave objects before 
one’s mind, and they are not the whole truth. 
 
Conclusion 
Metaphysics is too important a part of the Bodhicaryāvatāra to be 
ignored. The demands of pedagogy may necessitate its exclusion from 
introductory treatments, where there is not time for everything. But for 
a serious understanding of Śāntideva’s thought, metaphysical arguments 
are essential. They are key among the reasons he himself offers for his 
own ethics; without those reasons, an understanding of his ethics is 
superficial. We do not fully understand why patient endurance is 
important if we do not understand dependent origination; we do not 
understand his critiques of lust if we do not understand his atomism; we 
do not understand the value of altruism without seeing its foundation in 
non-self; and we do not understand non-attachment without emptiness.  
Once we do understand how metaphysics underlies Śāntideva’s 
ethics, his thought takes on a different cast—one which makes him look 
much more like the Western picture of a philosopher, constructing a 
system where theoretical and practical philosophy fit together into a 
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coherent picture. Now since Śāntideva is a Madhyamaka (and arguably a 
Prāsaṅgika), his system is something of an anti-system; a system of 
thought is in a sense something he aims to avoid. Yet there is something 
of a systemic quality to it in the connections he makes between 
metaphysics and ethics. Rather than articulating a metaphysical 
foundation, he is dismantling others’ metaphysical claims—but his 
ethical claims are incomplete without that dismantling. After all, the 
ethical claims too are about a dismantling, of the inadequate ways in 
which normal people react to the world—inappropriate ethical reactions 
based on inappropriate metaphysical beliefs. 
Śāntideva’s metaphysics, then, provide us with a more complete 
view of his ethical claims and their justification. This view, in turn, 
allows us a deeper picture of how Śāntideva might respond to 
contemporary arguments against views like his, such as the views of 
Martha Nussbaum that I explored in my dissertation. Nussbaum argues 
that such emotions as anger and attachment are tied up with people’s 
deepest values, in a way that puts the burden on their opponent to show 
why we should give them up (see Lele “Revaluation” 269–278). The 
claims discussed in this article illustrate how Śāntideva attempts to show 
us just this. If we truly understand the real nature of the goods we 
normally value, so he would claim, then we will come to see that that 
valuation is in error.  
It is not only Śāntideva’s work that may look different once we 
consider how metaphysics underlies his ethics. His work also helps us 
avoid the temptation to dismiss the significance of metaphysics in 
Buddhist thought generally (as we saw Thich Nhat Hanh and Taitetsu 
Unno doing in the introduction). We saw in the introduction how the 
Buddha’s instructions in the Shorter Māluṅkya Sutta do not rule out 
metaphysical questions in their entirety, but only those questions that 
do not help with the urgent task of liberation. In Śāntideva’s work we get 
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a clearer picture than most of how such questions can and do help with 
that task.  
It is a commonplace to point out that Buddhists, in Abhidharma 
texts and elsewhere, have engaged in a great deal of metaphysical 
argument. Śāntideva gives us an unusually clear picture of why that 
metaphysical argument matters. In his work, it turns out to be directly 
applicable to the immediate problems of living.  
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